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The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 introduced a refundable tax credit for 
low-income working families who purchased health insurance coverage for their 
children. This health insurance tax credit (HITC) existed during tax years 1991, 1992, 
and 1993, and was then rescinded. We use Current Population Survey data and a 
difference-in-differences approach to estimate the HITC’s effect on private health 
insurance coverage of low-earning single mothers. The findings suggest that during 
1991–1993, the health insurance coverage of single mothers was about 6 percentage 
points higher than it would have been in the absence of the HITC. 
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A longstanding proposal for increasing the health insurance coverage of low-
earning workers is to subsidize their coverage through a refundable tax credit (Pauly 
1999; Cogan, Hubbard, and Kessler 2005; Antos and Miller 2010). Such a Health 
Insurance Tax Credit (HITC) would grant a tax credit up to a specified maximum—for 
example, $2,000 for an individual and $5,000 for a family—on a tax return where the 
filer purchased a private health insurance policy (either employer-provided or in the 
market). The HITC was included in several of President George W. Bush’s budget 
proposals (McClellan and Baicker 2002; Office of Management and Budget 2005) and is 
a centerpiece of Wisconsin Representative Paul D. Ryan’s “Roadmap for America’s 
Future” (Ryan 2010). By reducing the price of health insurance to eligible taxpayers and 
extending the tax-favored treatment of health insurance to workers who lack access to 
employer-provided health insurance, the HITC would be expected to increase the 
percentage of low-income individuals and families covered by private health insurance. 
But controversy has surrounded the extent to which workers would take up an 
HITC and hence whether an HITC would reduce the number of uninsured individuals. 
Pauly and Herring (2001, 2002), Pauly, Song, and Herring (2001), and Wozniak and 
Emmons (2000) simulated a variety of HITC policies and found that a “reasonably 
generous” credit could reduce the number of uninsured individuals by roughly 50 
percent. However, simulations by Gruber (2000a,b) suggested that the HITC might 
reduce the number of uninsured by only about 10 percent.1 
                                                 
1 Pauly, Song, and Herring (2001) also note that health insurance tax credits could lead to broader changes 
in health insurance markets—including greater price competition among insurers—that are not accounted 
for in simulation models. Holtzblatt (2008) and Furman (2008) compare the HITC with other tax-based 
approaches to reforming health insurance. 
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A number of careful empirical studies have estimated workers’ responsiveness to 
health insurance subsidies and changes in premiums, but the range of estimates produced 
by these studies is disturbingly wide. Estimated price elasticities of health insurance take-
up range from close to 0 (Chernew, Frick, and McLaughlin 1997; Blumberg, Nichols, 
and Banthin 2001) to approximately –1.2 (Gruber and Poterba 1994; Marquis et al. 
2005). We review these studies more fully in the conclusion, but the wide range of 
estimates suggests a useful role for further research on how workers would respond to 
health insurance subsidies. 
In this paper, our goal is to obtain direct evidence on the effect of refundable tax 
credits on the health insurance coverage of low-earning workers. We do this by 
examining a supplemental credit that Congress added to the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) during 1991, 1992, and 1993. This policy provided a refundable tax credit of up 
to $428 in 1991 ($451 in 1992, and $465 in 1993) to EITC-eligible households that 
bought health insurance for a qualifying child. We treat this supplemental credit as a 
natural experiment and estimate its impact on the health insurance coverage of working 
single mothers using a difference-in-differences approach applied to Current Population 
Survey data. 
We first describe the tax credit (section 2), the approach to estimation (section 3), 
and the data we use (section 4). We then present the main findings (section 5), which 
suggest that the HITC increased private health insurance coverage of low-education 
working single mothers by about 6 percentage points (from a base of slightly less than 16 
percent). Section 5 also reports several falsification (or “placebo”) tests. Section 6 reports 
a range of sensitivity tests, including checks for whether the HITC affected labor supply, 
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and whether the findings could be biased by Medicaid crowd-out, state-level economic 
conditions, state AFDC waivers that preceded federal welfare reform, and state-level 
EITCs. Section 7 concludes by examining whether the implications of the findings make 
sense in light of the number of HITCs that were actually claimed, and by comparing the 
implications of the HITC findings with existing estimates of the price elasticity of health 
insurance take-up. 
 
2. Background: The Health Insurance Tax Credit, 1991–1993  
When Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990, 
it added a supplemental credit for health insurance purchases to the basic Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC) program (U.S. Government Accountability Office 1991, 1993). This 
HITC was a refundable tax credit for low-income workers with one or more children who 
bought health insurance—either employer-provided or private nongroup—covering the 
child or children. The credit offset only the cost of health insurance and did not cover co-
payments, deductibles, or out-of-pocket health expenses. To encourage participation, the 
credit was refundable, so taxpayers with no federal income tax liability could still receive 
a payment from the Internal Revenue Service. The HITC was repealed effective 
December 31, 1993, so it was available only during tax years 1991, 1992, and 1993.2  
The HITC had the same eligibility criteria as the EITC: To receive a credit, a 
household needed earnings and a qualifying child. To qualify, a child had to meet three 
requirements: (1) be a child, stepchild, grandchild, or foster or adopted child of the 
taxpayer; (2) have the same place of residence as the taxpayer for more than half the tax 
                                                 
2 See U.S. Government Accountability Office (1991, 1993, 1994) for discussions of why Congress 
eliminated the credit. We touch on these reasons later in this section and in the conclusion. 
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year; and (3) be under age 19 (or 24 if a full-time student) or be permanently disabled. 
Unlike the basic EITC, the HITC remained the same regardless of the number of 
qualifying children in the family. 
The HITC schedule closely followed the EITC’s.3 In 1991, a taxpayer with 
earnings and a qualifying child could receive a credit up to $428 if he or she bought 
private health insurance that covered the child. For households with earned incomes of $1 
to $7,140, the credit was 6 percent of earned income. For households with earnings 
between $7,140 and $11,250, the credit was $428 (6 percent of $7,140). For households 
with earnings between $11,250 and $21,250, the credit phased out at a rate of 4.28 
percent per marginal dollar earned and fell to $0 for earnings at or above $21,250 (see 
Figure A1). In 1991, the maximum HITC of $428 was 36 percent of the maximum EITC 
of $1,192. Like the EITC schedule, the HITC schedule was indexed to inflation.  
In 1991, the HITC’s first year, the average credit was $233, or 23 percent of the 
reported average annual health insurance premium of $1,029. Also in 1991, 2.3 million 
taxpayers received health insurance credits of $496 million (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office 1991). A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study 
(1994) estimated that the take-up rate for the HITC in 1991 (its first year) was in the 
range of 19 to 26 percent.4 In contrast, the take-up rate for the regular EITC was 80 to 86 
percent. The GAO attributed the relatively low HITC take-up rate to two factors. First, 
                                                 
3 Table A1 in the Appendix gives details of the HITC schedules and of the EITC schedules in the years 
before, during, and after the HITC existed. Figure A1 in the Appendix is a graphical representation of the 
HITC and EITC schedules in 1991. 
4 This take-up rate is based on GAO’s (1994) estimate from the March 1992 CPS that about 8.8 million 
families were eligible for the HITC in 1991; however, our tabulations suggest that this is an estimate not of 
the number of eligible families but eligible individuals. Our tabulations suggest that 5.2 families were 
eligible for the HITC in 1991, which implies an HITC take-up rate of about 44 percent. This latter estimate 
seems reasonable in light of Scholz’s (1994) estimate that the 1990 EITC take-up rate was 80 to 86 percent. 
We thank Paul Fronstin for advice on this point. 
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interviews with taxpayers at IRS service sites in six cities suggested that fewer than 30 
percent of EITC-eligible taxpayers knew the credit existed. Second, the GAO suggested 
the credit was too modest to induce low-income workers to buy health insurance. 
The GAO’s findings appear to have played a role in persuading Congress to 
eliminate the HITC in 1993 (effective 1994). However, as the evidence below suggests, 
the implicit conclusion that the HITC was ineffective may have been premature. Given 
the attention paid to tax credits for health insurance in the intervening years, it is curious 
that no analysis of the HITC’s impact on health insurance coverage appears to exist.  
 
3. Approach to Estimation  
We treat the HITC as a natural experiment and adopt a difference-in-differences 
approach to estimating its effects on the health insurance coverage of working single 
mothers with less than a high school education—hereafter, low-education working single 
mothers. The approach follows a large literature on the labor supply effects of the EITC 
including Eissa and Leibman (1996), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000), Eissa and Hoynes 
(2004), and Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz (2006). 
The population potentially affected by the HITC consisted of low-income 
working families with children. If the HITC had any effect on private health insurance 
coverage, then the coverage of low-income working families with children would have 
been greater than otherwise during 1991, 1992, and 1993. For three reasons, we focus on 
the HITC’s possible effect on private health insurance of low-education working single 
mothers. First, working single mothers were roughly 44 percent of all EITC-eligible 
households in 1990, making them the largest group of taxpayers eligible for the EITC and 
 
 6
hence for the HITC (Liebman 2000). Second, for households headed by a single woman, 
we can plausibly abstract from decisions made jointly with other family members (Eissa 
and Liebman 1996). Third, by focusing on high school dropouts, we can estimate the 
effect of the HITC on a group that is likely to be eligible (because it is likely to have low 
earnings) without conditioning explicitly on income or earnings. Conditioning on income 
or earnings is ruled out because the EITC creates incentives for earners to change their 
hours of work so as to qualify for the credit (Eissa and Hoynes 2006). Accordingly, our 
main “treatment” group is low-education working single mothers. 
A convincing difference-in-differences analysis requires a comparison or 
“control” group that is as similar as possible to the treatment group without being eligible 
for the HITC. In particular, we want a control group whose trend in health insurance 
coverage would have been the same as low-education working single mothers’ trend if 
the latter had not been affected by the HITC (Angrist and Krueger 1999; Blundell and 
MaCurdy 1999). Following Eissa and Liebman (1996), we choose working single women 
without children and with less than high school as the comparison group for low-
education working single mothers because, although they do not have children (and 
hence are ineligible for the EITC and HITC), they face essentially similar labor markets 
and economic conditions. As Figure 1 shows, the two groups had similar trends in health 
insurance coverage in the years preceding the HITC. 
Two concerns invariably arise with the difference-in-differences approach. First, 
if the treatment and control groups do differ in their characteristics, each may be affected 
differently by contemporaneous shocks (other than the HITC). In this case, the 
difference-in-differences approach may still be valid if we can control convincingly for 
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observables that capture characteristics of individuals that are correlated with health 
insurance coverage. Second, the difference-in-differences estimator may be contaminated 
if the compositions of the treatment and control groups change over time. In the present 
case, changes in tax and welfare programs increased the work incentives of single 
mothers between 1984 and 1996 (Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000, 2001). If single mothers 
who entered the labor force in later years were more likely to work part-time and hence 
less likely to have employer-provided health insurance, then changes in the 
characteristics of single mothers could have blunted any rise in private health insurance 
that may have occurred as a result of the HITC. We can again mitigate this problem by 
controlling for observable characteristics using regression, but it will also be important to 
examine the samples carefully to see whether and how much they did in fact change over 
time. We do this below in section 6.1. 
In the case of the HITC, a third issue arises—the treatment is in fact a 
combination of the HITC and increases in the EITC. As Appendix Table A1 shows, in 
the years preceding adoption of the HITC (1988–1990), the maximum credit under the 
EITC increased by 3, 4, and 5 percent per year ($23, $36, and $43). In contrast, during 
the HITC years (1991–1993) the maximum EITC increased by 25, 8, and 11 percent per 
year ($239, $89, and $110). Clearly, the increased generosity of the EITC may have 
contributed to any effect we attribute to the HITC—the specific subsidy of $428 to $465 
targeted on private health insurance—and we have no ready method for disentangling the 
contributions of each. Accordingly, when we refer to an HITC effect below, it should be 
understood that we are referring to an affect of the HITC combined with the above 
increases in the EITC. 
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The model we estimate can be written:  
Pr(coveredi =1|•) = F[β0 + β1 treatgroupi + β2 HITCt + β3 treatgroupi×HITCt + Xi β]     (1) 
where i indexes individuals and t indexes years; coveredi is a binary indicator of private 
health insurance coverage; treatgroupi equals one for a working single woman with a 
dependent child and less than high school, and zero otherwise; HITCt equals one for 
1991, 1992, and 1993 (years during which the HITC was in effect), and zero for 1988, 
1989, and 1990 (years before the HITC was in effect); and treatgroupi×HITCt captures 
the change in coverage rates for working single mothers, relative to working single 
women without children, after the HITC took effect. 
In the basic specification we estimate, the vector of controls Xi  includes age, 
indicators of race (white, black, and other), indicators of number of children (under age 6, 
aged 6–18, and aged 19–24 and a full-time student), indicators of work status (full-
time/full-year, full-time/part-year, part-time/full-year, and part-time/part-year),5 earned 
income,6 and unearned income.7 For some of the specification tests reported in Table 8, 
we include additional controls, as described later. We let F denote the standard normal 
cumulative density and estimate equation (1) as a probit.  
 
4. Data  
We estimate equation (1) using data from the March 1989–1994 Annual 
Demographic Supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS), which provide 
                                                 
5 Full-year work implies at least 50 weeks of work in the previous year. Full-time work implies usual 
weekly hours of 35 or more in the previous year. 
6 Earned income includes income from wages, salaries, and self-employment. 
7 Unearned income includes income from unemployment compensation, worker's compensation, social 
security or railroad retirement, supplemental security, public assistance or welfare, veteran payments, 
survivor benefits, disability, retirement funds, interest, dividends, rent, educational assistance, child 
support, alimony, contributions, financial assistance from friends, and other nonearnings. 
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information for tax years 1988 through 1993. Respondents to the March 1989, 1990, and 
1991 CPS constitute a before-HITC sample (tax years 1988, 1989, and 1990). 
Respondents to the March 1992, 1993, and 1994 CPS constitute a during-HITC sample 
(tax years 1991, 1992, and 1993). The relevant unit of observation is the tax-filing unit, 
which in the CPS implies allocating primary families and subfamilies to separate tax-
filing units.  
The sample includes women aged 19 to 448 who worked (had annual hours 
greater than zero), were single (never married, widowed, or divorced), and had less than a 
high school education. We exclude women who reported negative earnings, those in 
school full-time, those who were separated from their spouses, and those who reported 
being ill or disabled. The resulting sample, after pooling all six years, includes 3,661 
observations.  
We allocate working single women with at least one dependent child to the 
treatment group, and working single women without a child to the control group. We 
consider any child in the tax-filing unit who was under age 19 (or under age 24 if a full-
time student) to be a dependent child for tax purposes. Consistent with the EITC 
literature, we do not try to impose the support or residency test for HITC eligibility.9  
For two reasons, we limit the analysis to 1988 through 1993 and do not attempt to 
estimate the effect of the HITC’s repeal. First, when Congress passed the OBRA of 1993, 
which repealed the HITC, it enacted the largest expansion of the EITC in the credit’s 
                                                 
8 We restrict the sample to women aged 19 to 44 because women in this age range are most likely to have at 
least one dependent child (a child under age 19 or under age 24 and a full-time student who lives at home). 
When women aged 45 to 54 are added to the sample, the findings are essentially similar (available on 
request). 
9 This is mainly due to limitations of the CPS. However, using data from the SIPP and IRS, Scholz (1994) 
shows that the support test does not greatly change estimates of EITC eligibility. 
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history (see Appendix Table A1; Baughman and Dickert-Conlin 2003). In 1993, a mother 
of one child with earnings up to $7,750 could receive a credit of 18.5 percent of earned 
income, resulting in a maximum credit of $1,434. In 1994, the credit rate rose to 26.3 
percent of earned income, resulting in a maximum credit of $2,038. Also beginning in 
1994, eligibility for the credit was expanded to include families with no children, for 
whom the credit was 7.65 percent of earnings up to $4,000 (for a maximum 1994 credit 
of $306). As a result, the effects of repealing the HITC are confounded with the EITC 
expansion of 1994–1996. 
The second reason for restricting the analysis to 1988 through 1993 is that the 
CPS remained unchanged throughout this period. In March 1988, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics modified the CPS health insurance questions to capture more accurately the 
insurance coverage of dependents. The next important revisions to the CPS health 
insurance questions occurred in March 1995, when BLS introduced a more detailed set of 
health insurance questions. This led to an increase in the number of persons reporting 
employer-provided coverage.10 
During the years we examine, the CPS health insurance questions read as follows:  
75A. Other than government sponsored policies, health insurance can be obtained 
privately or through a current or former employer or union. Was anyone in this 
household covered by health insurance of this type at any time during 19xx [last 
year]? 
 
75B. Who was that? 
 
75C. Was …’s health insurance coverage from a plan in …’s own name?  
 
                                                 
10 In particular, previous surveys asked about employer coverage as a subset of private coverage, but 
beginning in March 1995 the survey asked separate questions about employer-provided and other types of 




75F. What other persons were covered by this health insurance policy? Possible 
answers are Spouse, Children in household, Children not in the household, Other, 
and No one. 
 
These questions allow us to define three alternative measures of health insurance:  
1. private insurance coverage, defined broadly to include coverage by a privately 
purchased or employer-provided health insurance plan, whether or not in the 
respondent’s own name (that is, positive responses to questions 75A and 75B) 
2. private insurance in the respondent’s own name (a subset of the first definition 
because it implies a positive response to question 75C) 
3. private insurance in the respondent’s own name that covers children in 
household (a subset of the second definition because it implies a “children in 
household” response to question 75F) 
Table 1 shows average private health insurance coverage rates for working single 
mothers and working single women without children during 1988–1993, using the 
measures of coverage defined above. For single mothers, the rate of insurance coverage 
in the respondent’s own name fell by 5.4 percentage points (from 32.3 to 27 percent); 
however, only about one-fifth of this decrease occurred after 1990. For single women 
without children, the coverage rate also fell somewhat between 1988 and 1990, but fell 
sharply after 1990 (from 37.8 to 20.9 percent). A likely explanation for the continued 
drop after 1990 is the recession of 1991, which would have reduced both employment 
and access to employer-provided health insurance of single women. 
In the following analysis, the outcome of interest is coverage by private health 
insurance, defined as whether a working single woman has private insurance in her own 
name that covers her child or children. We focus on this outcome because the HITC 
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could be used only to purchase a health insurance policy—either in the market or through 
an employer or union—covering a qualifying child. Figure 1 graphs the coverage rates 
for single mothers and single women without children.11 
Table 2 displays mean characteristics of working single mothers and working 
single women without children pooled for 1988–1993. The two groups differ in some 
important ways. Relative to single women without children, single mothers are more 
likely to be black (33.6 versus 14.7 percent) and less likely to work full-time, full-year 
(37.8 versus 49.1 percent). Also, single mothers have lower average earnings than single 
women without children ($7,257 versus $8,686). 
Table 3 displays summary statistics for both single mothers and single women 
without children in the before-HITC and during-HITC periods. With one exception, the 
characteristics of both single mothers and single women without children appear fairly 
stable. The exception is that the percentage of women (both single mothers and single 
women without children) working full-time, full-year dropped by 2.5 percentage points 
during the HITC period, reflecting the recession of 1991–1992. 
 
5. Empirical Findings 
5.1. Main findings—single women with less than high school 
Table 4 displays the average private health insurance coverage rates for single 
mothers and single women without children in the years before and during the HITC. The 
first row shows that health insurance coverage for single mothers fell by 2.4 percentage 
                                                 
11 Note that the private health insurance variable is constructed as “private insurance in own name that 
covers children” for single mothers and as “private insurance in own name” for single women without 
children. In an earlier version of this paper, we defined the private insurance variable as “private insurance 
in own name” for both single mothers and single women without children. The estimates we obtained 
(available on request) are essentially similar to those we report in this section and the next. 
 
 13
points between 1988–1990 and 1991–1993. The second row shows that, over the same 
period, coverage fell for single women without children by 9 percentage points. The 
implication is that, after netting out the declining trend in insurance coverage, the private 
health insurance coverage of single mothers was higher by 6.5 percentage points than it 
would have been without the HITC. The bootstrap standard error of this point estimate is 
0.031. 
Table 5 displays estimates of the key coefficients in equation (1).12 Specification 
1 includes no control variables. Specification 2 controls for age, race (white, black, and 
other), number of children under age 6, number of children aged 6–18, and number of 
children aged 19–24 and a full-time student. Specification 3 controls in addition for work 
status (full-time/full-year, full-time/part-year, part-time/full-year, and part-time/part-
year), earned income, and unearned income.  
In specification 1, the coefficient on treatgroup is –0.145 and statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.000). With the addition of demographic characteristics in 
specification 2, it falls to –0.080 (p-value = 0.006). In specification 3, when we control 
for work status and income along with demographic characteristics, it changes slightly 
from –0.080 to –0.084 (p-value = 0.000). That the coefficient on treatgroup falls as 
controls are added to the model (between specifications 1 and 2) suggests that observable 
characteristics other than the presence of children are important in explaining the 
difference between single mothers and single women without children in private health 
insurance coverage.  
                                                 
12 As described in the appendix, we follow DeLeire (2004) and obtain the probit DD estimator as the 
discrete double difference of the standard normal cumulative distribution function, averaged over all 




In specification 1, the coefficient on HITC is negative (–0.090) and statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.000). This is consistent with the declining trend in average health 
insurance coverage for both single mothers and single women without children. Including 
additional controls (specifications 2 and 3) leaves this estimate essentially unchanged. 
The estimate of main interest is the coefficient on the interaction term. This is 
essentially similar in size and statistical significance across the three specifications. The 
estimate from specification 3 estimate is 0.063 (p-value = 0.019), which suggests that 
private health insurance coverage of working single mothers with less than high school 
was higher by 6.3 percentage points than it would have been without the HITC.13  
5.2. Findings for single women with more education 
We would expect the estimated effect of the HITC on single mothers who 
completed high school (or who have some college or completed college) to be smaller 
than its effect on single mothers with less than high school for a simple reason: Single 
mothers with more education are less likely to be low earners and hence less likely to be 
eligible for the EITC and HITC. Accordingly, single mothers with more education offer a 
useful set of falsification (or “placebo”) tests of the estimates in Table 5: Finding that 
single mothers with more education experienced coverage increases similar to those of 
single mothers with less than high school would cast doubt on the findings in Table 5.  
Table 6 displays tests of the hypothesis that single mothers with more education 
were less likely than single mothers with less than high school to experience an HITC-
                                                 
13 Eligibility for the HITC depended on the presence of a dependent child, so the credit could have affected 
women’s fertility decisions. (Hotz and Scholz [2003] discuss fertility and the EITC.) To test whether the 
findings are sensitive to the assumption that the presence of children is exogenous, we reestimated the basic 
specification (Table 5, specification 3) after dropping single mothers with children younger than age 3 from 




induced increase in health insurance coverage. We do this by estimating equation (1) 
using samples of women with successively more educational attainment. The 
specifications are the same as specification 3 of Table 5; that is, they include 
demographic characteristics, indicators of work status, earned income, and unearned 
income as controls. We refer to this specification as the “basic specification.” 
The first row of Table 6 repeats the main finding from comparing single mothers 
and single women with less than high school (specification 3 of Table 5). The second row 
of Table 6 shows the results of comparing single mothers and single women with a high 
school education. The estimate on the interaction term is 0.043 with a p-value of 0.002, 
which suggests that the private health insurance coverage rate of single mothers with high 
school was 4.3 percentage points higher than it would have been without the HITC. This 
accords with the expectation that the HITC effect on single mothers should be less as 
educational attainment increases. 
The third and fourth rows of Table 6 show findings from comparisons for single 
mothers with some college and with a college degree or more. As expected, these 
comparisons produce still smaller estimated effects of the HITC on health insurance 
coverage. For single mothers with some college, the estimated HITC effect on health 
insurance coverage is 2.5 percentage points, but the estimate is imprecise (row 3 of Table 
6). The estimated effect of the HITC on health insurance coverage of single women with 
college or more is –0.006 percentage points—essentially zero. That these falsification 
tests behave as expected, with negligible responses to the HITC among single mothers 
who are increasing unlikely to be eligible for the HITC, tends to increase our confidence 
that Table 5 is identifying an HITC effect for low-education single women.  
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5.3. Findings by work status 
As another falsification test, we explore whether the effect of the HITC differed 
by work status. Because non-workers were not eligible for the HITC, we would not 
expect to observe HITC effects on the health insurance coverage of non-working single 
mothers. To test this hypothesis, we estimated equation (1) using a sample that includes 
3,136 non-working single mothers with less than high school in addition to the 3,661 
working single mothers used to obtain Table 5’s estimates. We allowed the HITC to have 
a differential effect on the health insurance coverage of working single mothers and non-
working single mothers. The estimated HITC effect for non-working single mothers (not 
reported in a table) is –0.004 percentage points (p-value = 0.718), compared with an 
estimated effect for working single mothers of 6.5 percentage points (p-value = 0.018). 
Accordingly, the HITC regime appears to have had no effect on a group of HITC-
ineligible women, many of whom would likely have been eligible had they worked. (We 
explore the possible effect of the HITC on labor supply below.) 
5.4. Findings disaggregated by year 
The estimates in Tables 5 and 6 are restrictive because they aggregate the three 
before-HITC years and the three during-HITC years. We would like to know whether it is 
reasonable to restrict the estimated effect of the HITC to be the same in the three during-
HITC years (1991, 1992, and 1993). Accordingly, we estimate a model that includes a set 
of year dummies (for 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992, and 1993), a treatment group dummy, and 
interactions of the treatment and year dummies. We estimate this model for the main 
group of interest—low-education working single women—and report estimates from a 
specification analogous to the basic specification. The estimates are year-specific 
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difference-in-differences estimates of the HITC effect on private health insurance 
coverage rates.  
The estimates, reported in Table 7, suggest that the 1991, 1992, and 1993 
coverage rates of single mothers with less than high school were higher by 6.4, 7.2, and 
11 percentage points than they would have been in the absence of the HITC (although 
only the estimate for 1993 has a p-value less than 0.05). The pattern of these estimates—
increasing over time—has at least two possible interpretations. First, it could be that the 
impact of the HITC increased as the existence of the program became known and its 
implications better understood. This would be consistent with the pattern of participation 
in several social programs (Madrian and Shea 2001; Remler and Glied 2003; Currie 
2006). Alternatively, it could be that we have omitted one or more variables that affected 
the health insurance coverage of low-education single mothers (but not other low-
education single women). We investigate the latter possibility next.  
 
6. Sensitivity Tests 
This section describes findings from four sets of sensitivity tests. We begin by 
exploring possible effects of the HITC on labor supply. We then attempt to control for 
factors affecting private health insurance in the early 1990s other than the HITC: (1) 
expansion of the Medicaid program, (2) state-level economic conditions and other state-
specific effects, and (3) welfare reform and the introduction of state-level EITCs.  
6.1. The HITC and labor supply 
Several empirical studies have found that the EITC substantially increases labor 
force participation of eligible groups (see the reviews by Hotz and Scholz 2003 and Eissa 
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and Hoynes 2006). Because the HITC’s structure was essentially similar to the EITC’s, 
the HITC may also have drawn women into the labor force. If so, then the composition of 
working single mothers during the HITC years may have differed from the composition 
before the HITC. Such compositional change, if substantial, could contaminate the 
difference-in-differences estimator. 
To examine whether the HITC substantially affected labor force participation we 
estimate a model along the lines of equation (1), but using employment (a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a woman reported working at least one hour during the year, 0 
otherwise) as the dependent variable. The specification is the same as specification 1 of 
Table 5. The estimates, reported in row 2 of Table 8, suggest that during the HITC years, 
labor force participation of low-education single mothers was higher by 2.1 percentage 
points; however, the estimated HITC effect is insignificant at conventional levels (p-
value = 0.40). It follows that, if the HITC did induce a change in the composition of 
working single mothers, it was likely small and hence unlikely to overturn the main 
finding from Table 5. 
6.2. Medicaid crowd-out  
During the years we are examining, eligibility for Medicaid expanded 
substantially to include low-income pregnant women and children with no ties to AFDC 
(see Appendix Table A2). Because Medicaid and private health insurance are potential 
substitutes—they offer similar health coverage, and Medicaid is much less costly—
Medicaid expansion may have drawn some low-income single mothers out of private 
health insurance and into Medicaid. Cutler and Gruber (1996) first referred to such 
substitution as “crowding out,” and to the extent it exists, the estimates in Tables 5, 6, and 
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7 could understate the HITC’s effect on private health insurance coverage. Alternatively, 
the availability of the HITC could conceivably have drawn some low-income single 
mothers out of Medicaid and into private health insurance, in which case the estimates in 
Table 5 would overstate the net impact of the HITC on health insurance coverage. 
To address these concerns, we estimate variants of equation (1) that use two 
alternative dependent variables: medicaid, a dummy indicator of whether a woman had 
Medicaid coverage, and insured, a dummy indicator of whether a woman had coverage 
from either Medicaid or private health insurance. In the first case, the question addressed 
is whether Medicaid coverage of low-education single mothers changed (relative to low-
education single women without children) during the HITC years. In the second case, the 
question addressed is whether overall health insurance coverage of low-education single 
mothers changed (relative to low-education single women without children) during the 
HITC years. 
Row 3 of Table 8 displays findings from the model in which medicaid is the 
dependent variable. The estimates offer only marginal evidence that relative Medicaid 
coverage of low-education single mothers was higher during the HITC period than in the 
prior years. (The point estimate is 1.4 percentage points, but the estimate is imprecise.) 
We interpret this finding as evidence that, if the Medicaid expansions did crowd out 
private health insurance during the HITC years, crowd-out was slight. 
Row 4 of Table 8 displays findings from the model in which insured (by either 
private health insurance or Medicaid) is the dependent variable. The estimates suggest 
that during the HITC period, relative net health insurance coverage of low-education 
single mothers was higher by 8.4 percentage points (p-value = 0.007) than in the 
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preceding years. Estimates from the basic specification in row 1 (from Table 5, 
specification 3) suggest that the HITC was the main factor in this net increase in health 
insurance coverage, and that Medicaid expansion played a relatively minor role. 
Together, rows 1, 3, and 4 suggest that 6.3 of the 8.4 percentage points were due to an 
increase in private coverage, and 1.4 percentage points were due to an increase in 
Medicaid coverage (although the latter is not statistically significant). A relatively small 
residual (0.7 percentage points) cannot be explained by either the HITC or changes in 
Medicaid.  
6.3. State-level economic conditions and state fixed effects 
It is also possible that changes in private health insurance coverage of low-
education single mothers were related to state-level economic conditions or to state fixed 
effects. To account for these possibilities, rows 5, 6, and 7 of Table 8 report estimates 
from models that successively add to the basic specification a set of state dummy 
variables (to control for time-invariant state-level effects on health coverage), the year-
specific contemporaneous state unemployment rate (to control for cyclical labor market 
influences on health insurance coverage), and both state fixed effects and the year-
specific state unemployment rate. 
The findings reported in rows 5, 6, and 7 of Table 8 suggest that including these 
state-level controls produces estimates that are essentially similar to the basic 
specification—an increase in single mothers’ private health insurance coverage of 





6.4. Welfare reform and state EITCs 
Although the findings in Table 5 are consistent with the HITC increasing private 
health insurance coverage of low-education single mothers, an alternative explanation for 
this increase is the welfare reforms adopted by some states after 1990. California, 
Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon, and Utah all implemented welfare waivers in 1993 
(DeLeire, Levine, and Levy 2006). These waivers changed the nature of AFDC by 
imposing time limits on AFDC participation and introducing work requirements for 
AFDC participants (Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000). If these changes moved single 
mothers into the labor market and onto private (employer-provided) health insurance, the 
estimates in Tables 5, 6, and 7 could overstate the HITC’s effect on private health 
insurance coverage.  
To address this possibility, we restrict the sample to low-education single women 
in states that did not have welfare waivers. Row 8 of Table 8 shows that restricting the 
sample in this way leaves the estimated HITC impact on single mothers essentially 
unchanged—the private health insurance coverage of single mothers increases by 6.3 
percentage points (p-value = 0.035). 
In addition to implementing welfare reforms, several states made changes in their 
EITCs during the period we examine. By 1993, six states had their own EITCs: 
Minnesota, Vermont, and Wisconsin had refundable EITCs, while Iowa, Maryland, and 
Rhode Island had non-refundable EITCs (Baughman 2005). When we restrict the sample 
to single women in states that did not have state-level EITCs, we again see no major 
change in the estimated effect of the HITC. The estimates reported in row 9 of Table 8 
show a relative increase in the coverage rate of single mothers of 6.5 percentage points 
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(p-value = 0.017), suggesting that changes in state EITCs were not responsible for the 
HITC effect we observed earlier. 
Row 10 of Table 8 shows the findings when we restrict the sample to women in 
states with neither welfare reforms nor state-level EITCs. Again, the main findings are 
essentially unchanged. 
Overall, the findings in Table 8 suggest that Table 5’s estimated HITC effect is 
robust to several alternative specifications, sample restrictions, and other tests. 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
A refundable tax credit for health insurance has been frequently proposed as a 
policy to expand health insurance coverage in the United States, but the extent to which 
an HITC would be effective has been a matter of debate. The Health Insurance Tax 
Credit of 1991 through 1993 offers a natural experiment that we have used to examine 
the effectiveness of credits. The main findings in Table 5 suggest that, as a result of the 
HITC, health insurance coverage among low-education working single mothers was 
higher than it would otherwise have been by roughly 6 percentage points—that is, 
without the HITC, only 15.7 percent of these women would have had health insurance 
covering their children during 1991–1993, whereas the actual (estimated) coverage rate 
was 22 percent (Tables 4 and 5). This main finding appears to stand up to a variety of 
falsification and sensitivity tests (see Tables 6 and 8 and the accompanying discussions).  
It makes sense to perform two further checks on the main findings. First, we 
explore whether enough households received an HITC to yield an effect of the size we 
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have estimated. Second, we compare our findings with previous evidence on the price 
elasticity of health insurance. 
Did enough households claim the HITC to account for the estimated effect? In 
order for the estimated HITC effects reported in rows 1 and 2 of Table 6 to make sense, 
36,500 single mothers with less than high school would need to have been newly covered 
by private health insurance, and 80,500 single mothers with only high school would need 
to have been newly covered.14 
In light of the number of HITCs actually claimed, are such increases reasonable? 
Internal Revenue Service records tabulated by the GAO (1994) show that about 2.3 
million tax returns claimed the HITC for tax year 1991. (Congress did not request GAO 
reports on the HITC in subsequent years.) Because IRS records do not include data on 
education, we need to impute the number of single mothers with less than high school 
(and with only high school) who claimed the HITC. We do this by applying population 
percentages from the CPS to the number of HITCs actually claimed. Tabulations of the 
March 1992 CPS suggest that, in 1991, about 5.2 million families were HITC-eligible, of 
whom 11.7 percent (608,000) were headed by single mothers with less than high school, 
and 36.1 percent (1,877,000) were headed by single mothers with only high school. 
Applying the population proportion of HITC-eligibles who were working single mothers 
with less than high school (0.117) to the number of HITCs received (2.3 million) suggests 
that about 269,100 of these women received a credit in 1991. By similar reasoning, about 
                                                 
14 The CPS estimate of the number of HITC-eligible single mothers with less than high school in 1991 is 
608,000. Roughly 21 percent of these, or 127,000, had private health insurance. The estimated HITC effect 
of 6 percentage points in Table 6, row 1, would imply 36,500 newly covered families as a result of the 
HITC. We obtain the estimate for single mothers with only high school in a similar way. 
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830,300 (0.361 of 2.3 million) working single mothers with only high school would have 
received a credit in 1991. 
Table 9 summarizes these imputations, which suggest that the estimated HITC 
effects for single mothers with less than high school (Table 6, row 1) are reasonable if 
13.6 percent of the HITCs that went to those women resulted in new private health 
insurance coverage. Similarly, the estimated effects for single mothers with only high 
school (Table 6, row 2) are reasonable if 9.7 percent of the HITCs claimed by those 
women resulted in new coverage. This is clearly an exercise in judgment and heuristics; 
however, we suggest that the estimates in Table 6 are plausible in light of the number of 
HITCs claimed and the estimated number of HITC-eligible households. 
Are the estimates we obtain from the HITC natural experiment consistent with 
existing estimates of the responsiveness of health insurance to premium changes? The 
main estimate we report implies a price elasticity of health insurance take-up of –1.27, 
and a semi-elasticity (the percentage point change in coverage resulting from a one 
percent increase in price15) of –0.24. We calculate these elasticities as follows: First, the 
HITC we are examining covered 23 percent of the reported average annual health 
insurance premium (U.S. Government Accountability Office 1991), which implies a 26 
percent decrease in the insurance premium (taking a midpoints approach, 23/88.5 = 
0.260). Also, the estimated 6.3 percentage-point increase in private health insurance 
coverage of single mothers during 1991, 1992, and 1993 represents a 33 percent increase 
in coverage (because from Table 4, 22 percent of single mothers were covered during the 
HITC years, which implies a counterfactual coverage rate of 15.7 percent). Accordingly, 
                                                 
15 See Gruber and Poterba (1994) and Congressional Budget Office (2005) for useful discussions of 
elasticity concepts in this literature. 
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a 26 percent reduction in the price of health insurance led to a 33 percent increase in 
health insurance coverage, which implies an elasticity of –1.27. For the semi-elasticity, a 
26 percent price reduction led to a 6.3 percentage point increase in coverage, giving a 
semi-elasticity of –0.24. 
As Table 10 shows, the price elasticity and semi-elasticity estimated from the 
HITC natural experiment are at the elastic end of the range of existing estimates that 
might be seen as comparable.16 The take-up elasticity we obtain from the HITC is similar 
to Gruber and Poterba’s (1994) for single, self-employed workers, and at the elastic end 
of the range found by Marquis et al. (2004).17 The semi-elasticities we obtain are at the 
elastic end of the range estimated by Chernew, Frick and McLaughlin (1997) and 
Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin (2001), and are similar to those obtained by Marquis et 
al. (2004) and the Congressional Budget Office (2005). The last two sets of estimates are 
obtained from samples of employed individuals who are near poverty—workers who 
should be similar to the low-education working single mothers we have examined. 
Table 5’s findings suggest that enough eligible low-earning workers with children 
would take up an HITC to significantly increase the health insurance coverage of such 
workers and their children. In that sense, they appear favorable to the HITC. 
Nevertheless, during the existence of the HITC, reports emerged that some insurers 
offered policies of little real value that happened to cost the same amount as the credit. 
Indeed, a Congressional investigation found that some insurers sold policies for children 
                                                 
16 In assembling Table 10, we gave priority to estimates based on lower-income, single workers in order to 
show estimates for workers who are similar to low-education working single mothers. The empirical 
literature has consistently estimated larger price elasticities for such workers than for higher-income and 
married workers [for discussions, see Gruber and Poterba (1994) and Marquis et al. (2004)]. We have 
included estimates both for those with and those without access to group health insurance, although 
estimated elasticities for the latter are generally smaller than for the former (Marquis et al. 2004). 
17 The take-up elasticity estimated from the HITC is larger than most others in Table 10 in part because the 
base level of coverage for the sample we examine is so low. 
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covering only “cancer, heart attacks, strokes, and other diseases that few children have” 
(Solomon 2007). Senator Lloyd Bentsen, the HITC’s original sponsor, considered these 
reported abuses serious enough that he led efforts to repeal the HITC. It is an open 
question whether such concerns could be mitigated by a well-developed private health 
insurance market or appropriate regulation.  
Also, our rough-and-ready attempt to calculate how many low-education working 
single mothers received the HITC (above and Table 9) suggests that the HITC went to 
many who would have purchased health insurance even without the credit. This lack of 
target efficiency may not be a major issue, given that the credits went to low-income 
households. Still, it raises questions, discussed in some depth by Gruber (2008) about 
whether the HITC is the most efficient way to expand health insurance coverage among 
low-income households. 
Finally, although the results presented here are consistent with the HITC 
increasing health insurance coverage substantially, the analysis is hampered by small 
sample sizes. It seems possible that further research using different data sources—panel 
data in particular—could give further evidence by allowing observation of the same 
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Table 1        
Health insurance coverage rates for low-education working single mothers and  
low-education working single women without children 
  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Single mothers       
        
 Private insurance 0.350 0.353 0.297 0.297 0.279 0.308 
        
 Private insurance in own name 0.323 0.325 0.276 0.278 0.255 0.270 
        
 Private insurance in own name 0.221 0.249 0.218 0.209 0.197 0.202 
 that covers children       
        
Single women without children       
        
 Private insurance 0.466 0.409 0.414 0.367 0.320 0.272 
        
 Private insurance in own name 0.398 0.385 0.378 0.341 0.283 0.209 
Notes: The data are from the March 1989–1994 Annual Demographic Supplements to the 
Current Population Survey (CPS). The sample contains working single women with less 
than a high school education. We define "working" as having positive hours and positive 
earnings during the year. We exclude women who are in school full-time, those who are 
separated from their spouse, and those who report being ill or disabled. Means are 
tabulated using CPS March supplement weights. Sample sizes are 2,228 (single mothers) 




Summary statistics: low-education working single mothers and low-education 








Age (years)  30.5 29.7 
    
White (%)  63.8 81.0 
    
Black (%)  33.6 14.7 
    
Other race (%)  2.6 4.4 
    
Has children under age 6 (%)  48.6 0.0 
    
Has children aged 6–18 (%)  69.9 0.0 
    
Has children aged 19–24   2.0 0.0 
and a full-time student (%)    
    
Full-time, full-year (%)  37.8 49.1 
    
Part-time, full-year (%)  8.9 9.2 
    
Full-time, part-year (%)  31.7 29.0 
    
Part-time, part-year (%)  21.6 12.8 
    
Earned income ($)  7,257 8,686 
    
Unearned income ($)  1,833 464 
    
Number of observations  2,228 1,433 
Notes: See Table 1. Dollar amounts are converted to 1993 dollars using the Consumer 
Price Index, All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). 
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Table 3     
Summary statistics for low-education working single mothers and low-education 
working single women without children, before and during HITC 
 
Single mothers 
















Age (years) 30.3 30.7  29.6 29.8 
      
White (%) 64.6 63.0  81.8 80.1 
      
Black (%) 32.9 34.4  15.5 13.7 
      
Other race (%) 2.5 2.7  2.6 6.2 
      
Has children under age 6 (%) 48.6 48.7  0.0 0.0 
      
Has children aged 6–18 (%) 70.5 69.3  0.0 0.0 
      
Has children aged 19–24  1.5 2.4  0.0 0.0 
and a full-time student (%)      
      
Full-time, full-year (%) 39.0 36.5  50.4 47.6 
      
Part-time, full-year (%) 7.2 10.7  6.8 11.6 
      
Full-time, part-year (%) 31.6 31.7  31.7 26.0 
      
Part-time, part-year (%) 22.2 21.1  11.1 14.7 
      
Earned income ($) 6,770 7,764  8,003 9,419 
      
Unearned income ($) 1,599 2,077  472 455 
      
Number of observations 1,153 1,075  741 692 
Notes: See Table 1. Dollar amounts are converted to 1993 dollars using the Consumer 
Price Index, All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). 
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Table 4        
Private health insurance coverage rates for low-education working single mothers 
and low-education working single women without children 
  Before HITC During HITC  Difference  
  (1988–1990) (1991–1993)    
Single mothers  0.244 0.220  –0.024  
  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.018)  
  [1,153] [1,075]    
       
Single women  0.389 0.299  –0.090  
without children  (0.018) (0.017)  (0.025)  
  [741] [692]    
       
Difference  –0.145 –0.080  —  
  (0.022) (0.022)    
       
Difference-in-differences  — —  0.065  
     (0.031)  
Notes: See Table 1. Figures are average rates of private health insurance coverage in own 







Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the HITC on private health insurance 
coverage of low-education working single mothers from probit estimates of equation (1) 
Dependent variable:   Specification 
covered by private health insurance (1)  (2)  (3) 
treatgroup –0.145  –0.080  –0.084 
    (0.020)  (0.029)  (0.026) 
         
HITC –0.090  –0.087  –0.104 
    (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.021) 
         
treatgroup×HITC  0.065  0.060  0.063 
    (0.030)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
         
Number of observations  3,661  3,661  3,661 
         
Pseudo R-squared  0.020  0.061  0.256 
Notes: See Table 1. Figures are estimated changes (marginal effects) in the probability of 
private health insurance coverage in own name and covering a child from probit models. 
Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. Specification 1 includes no control variables. 
Specification 2 includes age, indicators of race (white, black, and other), number of children 
under age 6, number of children aged 6–18, and number of children aged 19–24 and a full-
time student. Specification 3 adds indicators of work status (full-time/full-year, full-time/part-
year, part-time/full-year, and part-time/part-year), earned income, and unearned income to the 
controls in specification 2. Estimated marginal effects for all regressors are reported in 




Difference-in-differences estimates from alternative treatment and comparison groups 
Dependent variable: covered by private health insurance  treatgroup  HITC  treatgroup×HITC  
1. Treatment group: –0.084  –0.104  0.063  
  Single mothers with less than high school [N=2,228] (0.026)  (0.021) (0.028)  
 Control group:       
  Single women with less than high school [N =1,433]       
2. Treatment group: –0.166  –0.107  0.043   
  Single mothers with high school [N=6,794] (0.016)  (0.011) (0.016)  
 Control group:       
  Single women with high school [N =6,608]       
3. Treatment group: –0.173  –0.098  0.025   
  Single mothers with some college [N =3,630] (0.020) (0.012) (0.021)  
 Control group:       
  Single women with some college [N =5,060 ]       
4. Treatment group: –0.184 –0.048  –0.006  
  Single mothers with college [N =1,179] (0.034)  (0.009) (0.024)  
 Control group:       
  Single women with college [N =5,736]       
Notes: Estimates in row 1 come from specification 3 of Table 5. Estimates in rows 2, 3, and 4 come from applying the 




Table 7     
Difference-in-differences estimates of the change in private health insurance 
coverage relative to 1990, low-education working single mothers 
Dependent variable: covered by private health insurance  
1988×treatgroup   0.025  
   (0.042)  
1989×treatgroup   0.036  
   (0.044)  
1990×treatgroup   —  
     
1991×treatgroup   0.064   
   (0.046)  
1992×treatgroup   0.072   
   (0.048)  
1993×treatgroup   0.110   
   (0.046)  
Number of observations  3,661  
Pseudo R-squared  0.264  
Notes: See Table 1. Figures are estimated changes in the probability of private 
health insurance coverage from a probit model. Bootstrap standard errors are in 
parentheses. The specification includes age, race, number of children, work 
status, earned income, unearned income, and a set of year indicators. The 





Table 8        
Sensitivity tests for HITC effects on low-education working single mothers 
Dependent variable: covered by private health 





1. Basic specification (Table 5, specification 3) –0.084 –0.104 0.063 3,661 0.256 
    (0.026) (0.021) (0.028)   
2. Basic specification, but dependent variable is  –0.263 –0.063 0.021 6,797 0.034 
 whether employed (0.021) (0.020) (0.404)   
3. Basic specification, but dependent variable is  0.129 0.059 0.014 3,661 0.132 
 whether covered by Medicaid (0.022) (0.020) (0.025)   
4. Basic specification, but dependent variable is  –0.018 –0.074 0.084 3,661 0.067 
 covered by either private insurance or Medicaid (0.027) (0.027) (0.030)   
5. Add state dummies to the basic specification –0.090 –0.106 0.068 3,661 0.291 
    (0.021) (0.020) (0.028)   
6. Add state unemployment rate to the basic  –0.085 –0.079 0.063 3,661 0.259 
 specification   (0.021) (0.021) (0.029)   
7. Add state dummies and state unemployment  –0.089 –0.136 0.067 3,661 0.292 
 rate to the basic specification (0.021) (0.023) (0.028)   
8. Restrict sample to single women in states  –0.089 –0.120 0.063 2,845 0.268 
 without welfare waivers in 1993 (0.030) (0.022) (0.033)   
9. Restrict sample to single women in states  –0.093 –0.106 0.065 3,484 0.258 
 without state EITCs (0.027) (0.020) (0.023)   
10. Restrict sample to single women in states  –0.102 –0.125 0.067 2,668 0.270 
 without welfare waivers in 1993 and without  (0.028) (0.024) (0.031)   
 state EITCs      
Notes: See Table 5. Estimates in row 1 (basic specification) come from specification 3 of Table 5. The basic specification 
(row 1) includes age, race, number of children, work status, earned income, and unearned income as controls. Bootstrap 






Implications of the estimates: Proportions of HITCs resulting in new health 
insurance coverage 
 
 Working single mothers 
with less than high school 
Working single mothers 
with only high school 
 
1. Covered by private health 
insurance (from CPS) 
127,000 953,200 
2. Number newly covered 
implied by estimated 
effects in Table 6 
36,500 80,500 
3. HITC-eligible in 1991 
(from CPS) 608,000 1,876,500 
4. Received HITC in 1991 
(imputed from sample 
proportions) 
172,500 
(= 2,300,000 × 0.117) 
453,100 
(= 2,300,000 × 0.361) 
5. Row 2/Row 4 (proportion 





Note: Rows 1 and 3 report authors’ tabulations of the March 1992 Current Population 
Survey. Row 2 reports the number of working single mothers newly covered by private 
health insurance implied by the estimated HITC effects in Table 6, rows 1 and 2. Row 4 
reports imputations based on IRS records of the number of HITCs claimed (from GAO 
1994) and CPS sample proportions of HITC-eligible working single mothers with less 







Estimated price elasticities of health insurance (HI) take-up, selected studies 
Study Source of price variation Sample Elasticity of take-up 
Semi-elasticity 
of take-up 
Gruber and Poterba (1994) 1986 Tax Reform Act Single, self-employed workers –1.23 –1.78 
Marquis and Long (1995) HI premium imputed to 
family
Working families without 
access to group HI 
  
   below 200% poverty –0.64 to –0.31 –0.09 to –0.07 
   above 200% poverty –0.45 to –0.27 –0.10 to –0.08 
Chernew, Frick, and 
McLaughlin (1997) 
Observed HI premium or 
employee contribution 
Single workers below 200% 
poverty 
–0.27 to –0.03 –0.19 to –0.03 
Blumberg, Nichols, and 
Banthin (2001) 
Observed or imputed HI 
premium 
Workers with children (or 
married) aged 18 to 64 and 
below 200% poverty 
–0.30 to –0.06 –0.28 to –0.05 
Long and Marquis (2002) Public subsidy schedule Low-income adults in 
Washington State 
–0.7 to –0.3 –0.06 to –0.04 
Marquis, Buntin, Escarce, 
Kapur, and Yegian (2004) 
HI premium imputed to 
individual 
California families without 
access to group HI 
  
   below 200% poverty,  
   age < 35, self-employed
–1.21 to –0.71 –0.14 to –0.10 
   below 200% poverty,  
   age < 35, not self-employed
–1.03 to –0.52 –0.24 to –0.21 
Congressional Budget 
Office (2005) 
Premium differences from 
state-level regulations
Individual workers without 
access to group health plan
  
   full sample –0.57 –0.09 
   below 200% poverty –0.84 –0.19 
Cebi and Woodbury (2010) Introduction of Health 
Insurance Tax Credit
Working single mothers with 
less than high school 
–1.27 –0.24 





Health insurance coverage rates for low-education working single mothers and low-
























Earned Income Tax Credit parameters 
Basic Tax Credit parameters, 1987–1996, nominal dollars 
Tax year  Phase-in Phase-in Maximum Phase-out Phase-out 
  rate (%) range ($) credit ($) rate (%) range ($) 
1987  14.00 0–6,080    851 10.00 6,920–15,432
1988  14.00 0–6,240    874 10.00 9,840–18,576
1989  14.00 0–6,500    910 10.00 10,240–19,340
1990  14.00 0–6,810    953 10.00 10,730–20,264
1991       
    One child 16.70 0–7,140 1,192 11.93 11,250–21,250
 Two children 17.30 0–7,140 1,235 12.36 11,250–21,250
1992       
   One child 17.60 0–7,520 1,324 12.57 11,840–22,370
 Two children 18.40 0–7,520 1,384 13.14 11,840–22,370
1993       
   One child 18.50 0–7,750 1,434 13.21 12,200–23,050
 Two children 19.50 0–7,750 1,511 13.93 12,200–23,050
1994       
 No child   7.65 0–4,000    306   7.65 5,000–9,000
   One child 26.30 0–7,750 2,038 15.98 11,000–23,755
 Two children 30.00 0–8,245 2,528 17.98 11,000–25,296
1995       
 No child   7.65 0–4,100    314   7.65 5,130–9,500
   One child 34.00 0–6,160 2,094 15.98 11,290–24,396
 Two children 36.00 0–8,640 3,110 20.22 11,290–26,673
1996       
 No child   7.65 0–4,220    323   7.65 5,280–9,500
   One child 34.00 0–6,330 2,152 15.98 11,610–25,078
 Two children 40.00 0–8,890 3,556 21.06 11,610–28,495
 
Health Insurance Tax Credit parameters, 1991–1993, nominal dollars 
Tax year  Phase-in Phase-in Maximum Phase-out Phase-out 
  rate (%) range ($) credit ($) rate (%) range ($) 
1991      6.00 0–7,140    428  4.28   11,250–21,250 
1992      6.00 0–7,520    451  4.28   11,840–22,370 
1993      6.00 0–7,750    465  4.28   12,200–23,050 






Major legislative changes affecting low-income women, 1987–1994 
Tax year Earned Income Tax Credit 
1988 The beginning and end of the phase-out range increased by about 
$3,000. 
1991 The credit rates rose by 2 percentage points. 
 
 
Additional credits established for families with two or more children. 
The new increment to the maximum credit for a second child was $43. 
 Supplemental credits added for child health insurance premiums and 
children less than one year of age. 
1992 The credit rates rose by one percentage point. 
 The increment to the maximum credit for a second child rose to $60. 
1993 The credit rates rose by one percentage point. 
 The increment to the maximum credit for a second child rose to $77. 
1994 The credit rates rose by about 10 percentage points. 
 The increment to the maximum credit for a second child rose to $490. 
 Supplemental credits for health insurance and children less than one 
year of age repealed. 
 Small credits established for taxpayers without children and between the 
ages of 25 and 65. 
 The IRS began to notify eligible taxpayers of the advance payment 
option, which had been available since 1979. 
Tax year Medicaid 
April 1987 States permitted to extend Medicaid coverage to children under age two 
in families below 100 percent of the poverty line. 
July 1988 States permitted to extend Medicaid coverage to children under age five 
in families below 100 percent of the poverty line. 
October 1988 States permitted to extend Medicaid coverage to children under age 
eight in families below 100 percent of the poverty line, and to children 
under age one in families below 185 percent of the poverty line. 
July 1989 States required to extend Medicaid coverage to children under age one 
in families below 75 percent of the poverty line. 
April 1990 States required to extend Medicaid coverage to children under age six in 
families below 133 percent of the poverty line. 
July 1991 States required to extend Medicaid coverage to children under age 19 in 
families below 100 percent of the poverty line. 
Source: U.S. General Accountability Office (1993); U.S. House of Representatives 





Table A3    
Estimated marginal effects from probit models underlying Table 5 estimates 
Dependent variable:  
covered by private health insurance  (1) (2) (3) 
treatgroup –0.145 –0.080 –0.084 
 (0.020) (0.029) (0.026) 
HITC –0.090 –0.087 –0.104 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) 
treatgroup×HITC 0.065 0.060 0.063 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) 
Age — 0.011 0.005 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
White — –0.012 –0.009 
  (0.035) (0.031) 
Black — –0.057 –0.033 
  (0.036) (0.033) 
Number of children under age 6 — –0.046 –0.004 
  (0.015) (0.014) 
Number of children aged 6-18 — –0.030 –0.019 
  (0.010) (0.009) 
Number of children aged 19-24 — –0.034 –0.029 
and a full-time student  (0.053) (0.047) 
    
Full-time, full-year — — 0.259 
   (0.034) 
Part-time, full-year — — 0.077 
   (0.035) 
Full-time, part-year — — 0.138 
   (0.027) 
Part-time, part-year — — — 
    
Earned income — — 0.018 
   (0.002) 
Unearned income — — 0.005 
   (0.003) 
    
Number of observations 3,661 3,661 3,661 
Pseudo R-squared 0.020 0.061 0.256 
Notes: Figures are estimated changes in the probability of private health insurance 







Estimated marginal effects from probit model underlying Table 7 estimates 
Dependent variable: covered by private health insurance 
treatgroup –0.104  
 (0.032)  
1988  0.036  
  (0.036)  
1989  0.012  
  (0.039)  
1990  —  
    
1991  –0.037  
  (0.034)  
1992  –0.094  
  (0.034)  
1993  –0.144  
  (0.034)  
1988×treatgroup  0.025  
  (0.042)  
1989×treatgroup  0.036  
  (0.044)  
1990×treatgroup  —  
    
1991×treatgroup  0.064   
  (0.046)  
1992×treatgroup  0.072   
  (0.048)  
1993×treatgroup  0.110   
  (0.046)  
Age  0.005  
  (0.001)  
White  –0.008  
  (0.030)  
Black  –0.031  
  (0.034)  
Number of children under age 6 –0.004  
  (0.013)  
Number of children aged 6–18 –0.019  
  (0.009)  
Number of children aged 19–24 –0.027  







Table A4 (continued) 
Dependent variable: covered by private health insurance  
Full-time, full-year  0.257  
  (0.034)  
Part-time, full-year  0.077  
  (0.039)  
Full-time, part-year 0.138  
  (0.028)  
Part-time, part-year —  
    
Earned income  0.018  
  (0.002)  
Unearned income  0.006  
  (0.003)  
Number of observations   3,661  
Pseudo R-squared 0.264  
Notes: Figures are estimated changes in the probability of private health insurance 













Phase-in range Plateau Phase-out range 
7,140 11,250 21,250 
Household earnings ($) 























Difference-in-differences estimates in linear probability and probit models 
 
In a linear probability model, calculating a difference-in-differences (DD) 
estimate is straightforward. In the simplest case, we have two time periods (pre and post) 
and two groups (control and treatment). Letting y be the binary outcome of interest, the 
linear probability model can be written: 
Pr(y = 1|•) = β0 + β1 treatment + β2 post + β3 treatment×post + Xβ   (A.1) 
where X denotes a vector of explanatory variables. In this setting, the DD estimator is the 
OLS estimator of β3 (the coefficient on the interaction between treatment and post). 
If (A.1) is estimated as a probit model, the DD estimator is no longer the 
coefficient on the interaction term. To illustrate, consider the following: 
Pr(y = 1|•) = Φ(β0 + β1 treatment + β2 post + β3 treatment×post + Xβ)  (A.2) 
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The marginal effect of 
the interaction term (the analog to β3 in the linear probability model) is: 


















3210|1Pr    (A.3) 
But the DD estimator is the marginal effect of changes in both treatment and post: 
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103210   (A.4) 
As discussed by Ai and Norton (2003), Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004), and DeLeire 
(2004), many authors incorrectly interpret equation (A.3) as a DD estimator, but equation 
(A.4) makes clear that, in the probit model, the marginal effect of a change in the 




 Following DeLeire (2004), we obtain DD estimates from probit models by taking 
the discrete double difference of the standard normal cumulative distribution function. In 
particular, we estimate the probit analog to equation (1): 
Pr(coveredi =1|•) = Φ[β0 + β1treatgroupi + β2HITCt + β3treatgroupi×HITCt + Xi β] 
then predict four counterfactual probabilities for each observation in the sample: 
1. The predicted probability of private health insurance coverage for the treatment 
group in the post-HITC period: ( )βββββ ˆˆˆˆˆ 3210 iΧ++++Φ  
2. The predicted probability of private health insurance coverage for the treatment 
group in the pre-HITC period: ( )βββ ˆˆˆ 10 iΧ++Φ  
3. The predicted probability of private health insurance coverage for the control 
group in the post-HITC period: ( )βββ ˆˆˆ 20 iΧ++Φ  
4. The predicted probability of private health insurance coverage for the control 
group in the pre-HITC period: ( )ββ ˆˆ0 iΧ+Φ  
Using these predicted probabilities, we calculate the DD for each observation as 
( ) ( )[ ]





















The probit DD estimator is the average of this double difference over all observations. 
Obtaining standard errors by the bootstrap method is straightforward. 
